Wisdom Newsletter – Arbitration (Issue 39)


Beware of Getting Off on the Wrong Foot

In the matter of the Arbitration Ordinance, Cap 609 and In the matter of an Arbitration between: AB v CD, HCCT 27/2020, Hon Mimmie Chan J in Chambers, 18 February 2021


The arbitration conducted by HKIAC concerns a dispute under an agreement between AB Bureau and CD (“Agreement”). Pursuant to the arbitration clause in the Agreement, CD issued a Notice of Arbitration in April 2019. Both the Agreement and the Notice of Arbitration named AB Bureau as respondent. On 16 and 17 July 2019, CD received two emails from employees of AB Engineering requesting further information and documentation from CD regarding the Arbitration. Subsequently, CD submitted an Amended Notice of Arbitration revising the name of respondent from “AB Bureau” to “AB Bureau also known as AB Bureau Co, Ltd” in July 2019.

On November 2019, in relying on information in AB Engineering’s website, CD concluded that AB Bureau became AB Engineering after a restructuring and applied to further revise the respondent’s name from “AB Bureau” to “AB Engineering”. Following CD’s request, the arbitrator gave effect to the change of name and ordered that further service of notice on AB Engineering was not necessary.

The arbitral award (“Award”) issued in March 2020 named AB Engineering as the respondent. It was noted by the arbitrator in the Award that the AB Engineering did not participate in the Arbitration.

AB Engineering applied to the Court to set aside the Award on the following basis:

AB Engineering was not a party to the Agreement, and there was no valid arbitration agreement between AB Engineering and CD (Article 34 (2)(a)(i) of the UNCITRAL Model Law);

the Award contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to the arbitration (Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law); and

AB Engineering was not given proper notice of an arbitrator or of the arbitration proceeding (Article 34 (2) (a) (ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law).

Should AB Engineering succeed on any of the above grounds, the Court could set aside the Award.


On evidence, it was obvious that AB Bureau and AB Engineering, having different unified social credit codes on the Mainland, are two separate and distinct legal entities. In opposition, CD argued that the Award is enforceable against AB Engineering on the basis that it was a party to the Agreement and alternatively, it was estopped from applying to set aside the Award.

CD’s argument was that AB Engineering, being a subsidiary of AB Bureau at the time of the Agreement, was a party to the Agreement by virtue of the definition of AB. In the Agreement, AB is defined to mean “AB Bureau or any other Affiliated entity”. Having construed the Agreement, the Court found that the Agreement was made between CD and AB Bureau only, and that the Agreement did not stipulate the rights and obligations of AB Engineering at all. This distinguished the case from Giorgio Armani SpA v Elan Clothes Co Ltd [2020] 1 HKLRD 354, where the underlying agreement was expressly made “by and between” the parent company, SpA, “together with its branch offices and Affiliates” and expressly listed the rights and obligations of SpA and its Affiliates

Even if AB Engineering was a party to the Agreement, the Court held that there was no proper service of the Notice of Arbitration and the Amended Notice of Arbitration (“Notices of Arbitration”) onto AB Engineering: Firstly, the Notices of Arbitration had never been sent to the proper registered address of AB Engineering. Furthermore, the Notices of Arbitration were addressed to AB Bureau and not AB Engineering. In naming a totally different company in the Notices of Arbitration, the Court held that CD had not given adequate and proper notice of the arbitral proceeding to AB Engineering.

CD also argued that as the employees of AB Engineering had misled CD to believe that AB Bureau and AB Engineering were the same entity, AB Engineering was estopped from applying to set aside the Award. However, it was found that CD relied solely and erroneously on information in AB Engineering’s website rather than on the alleged misrepresentation of AB Engineering’s employees. In fact, there was no such statement made on the website supporting CD’s conclusion that AB Bureau became AB Engineering after a restructuring. AB Engineering did not participate in the arbitration and as such, there was no submission to the arbitration.

In conclusion, the Court rejected CD’s arguments and held that the Award should be set aside under Article 34(2)(a)(i) and (ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law.


As highlighted by the Court, serving a proper notice of arbitration is a key step in arbitration proceeding as it goes to the jurisdiction of the tribunal. This case again reminds the claimant and its legal advisor the Court’s (otherwise, the tribunal’s) emphasis of due process and serving the notice of arbitration on the correct party. While it is often a combination of various factors (i.e companies under a complex corporate structure bearing similar names and the claimant assuming the veracity of information on external sources) that contributed to a case of misnomer, such mistakes could have been avoided had the claimant been more cautious and taken extra steps, i.e. conducting background searches and company searches.

While it is rare for the Court to set aside an arbitral award, it will exercise such discretion if the award debtor can establish a statutory ground for set aside and the circumstances justify the Court to do so. Misnomer in the name of counterparties, which may be mere inadvertence, would be detrimental to the claimant, who may risk the arbitral award being set aside and bear legal costs of the award debtor at the same time.

Closely related, a claimant may find it tempting to serve a notice of arbitration onto the employee or agent of the intended respondent. As a general rule, an employee, agent or P&I club with general authority to deal with the case on behalf of its employer, principal or member respectively does not have the authority to accept service of a notice of arbitration

In Sino Channel Asia Limited v Dana Shipping and Trading PTE Singapore and Anor [2017] EWCA CIV 1703, the English Court of Appeal (“English Court”) found that on evidence, a Beijing XCty Trading Limited (“BX”) had both implied actual authority and ostensible authority to receive Dana’s Notice on Sino’s behalf. That said, the English Court admitted that such decision was premised on the unusual facts that Sino, while assuming liability to Dana under the contract in question, took no part, no role and no interest in the negotiation or performance of the said contract. Sino imposed no safeguards and no notice requirements upon BX as to either the terms of the contract or its performance.

Furthermore, the relationship between Sino and BX gave Dana the impression that BX was to be dealt with for all purposes, including the receipt of the notice of arbitration. The holding out manifested itself in Sino’s conduct of its relationship with BX, including the manner in which Sino’s broker acted in passing on the notice to a Mr. Cai of BX.

As such, it is advised that claimant and its legal advisor should avoid setting a foot wrong in the very first place.

Wisdom Newsletter – Issue 38

Happy Chinese New Year of the Ox


Law Chung Tai v. Sun Profit Logistics (HK) Limited and anr., DCEC No. 606 of 2019, H.H. Judge Levy, 15th July 2020.


The Applicant of this case claimed against his employer, Sun Profit Logistics (HK) Limited (“Sun Profit”) in respect of an accident occurred in the course of employment on 12th September 2018.  Falcon Insurance Company (Hong Kong) Limited (“Falcon”) was Sun Profit’s insurer.

Sun Profit did not participate in the legal proceedings and in default of filing of an Answer, Interlocutory Judgment was entered against Sun Profit at the 2nd direction hearing on 20th December 2019.  Later on the same day, Falcon issued a joinder summons seeking leave to join-in as the 2nd Respondent.

The Applicant opposed Falcon being joined to contest liability, but took a neutral stance in relation to quantum.

Falcon cited of Wong Shan Shan & Another v. The Incorporated Owners of Yue Wah Mansion & Anor, HCA No. 1086 of 2013, unreported, 28th January 2015 in which the Learned Deputy Judge took the view that there was no requirement for the intervener to show merits in a joinder application.

There is no dispute that Falcon received notice of proceedings on 28th March 2019 and knew the nature of the claim against Sun Profit.  On 23rd July 2019 before the 1st direction hearing, Falcon repudiated liability under the relevant insurance policy.  Falcon alleged there are number of cases against Sun Profit around the same time and those cases are unusual and extraordinary.

Falcon also knew Sun Profit did not appear at the 1st direction hearing on 23rd August 2019 and the Court directed Sun Profit to serve an Answer to the claim after being served with the Order of the 1st direction hearing.

Before the 2nd direction hearing on 20th December 2019, Falcon obtained the consent from the Applicant’s former solicitors in relation to the joining-in application.  Due to procedural oversight, Falcon only issued the summons after Interlocutory Judgment was entered, albeit on the same date.

Having learned the Interlocutory Judgment on 3rd April 2020 and despite Falcon’s suspicious over the various cases against Sun Profit including the present one, Falcon did not seek to challenge the validity of the Interlocutory Judgment.


The Learned Judge ruled that Falcon was facing a valid and enforceable Interlocutory Judgment and following the case of Wong Kam Fai v. Yu Sai Wan and Ors., [1993] HKDCLR 67 hence its rights to challenge liability is lost by virtue of the Interlocutory Judgment.

In Wong Kam Fai, default judgment had also been entered against the respondents employers before the insurer applied to join in the proceedings pursuant to section 43(3) of the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance, Cap. 282 (“ECO”).  The District Judge held that though the insurer in general should have the right to challenge the employment relationship under section 43(3) of ECO, its right, however, “must be affected by the default judgment entered against the 1st and 2nd respondents on liability”.  In the absence of an application to set aside the default judgment in Wong Kam Fai, the Learned Judge granted leave to the insurer to deal with the assessment of compensation only.


The rocks on the path are not inevitable.

First, when one receives new instruction from insurer clients, one would have expected those instructing would monitor the progress of a direction hearing.  At the very least, those instructing should send somebody to hold a watching brief at the direction hearing even if the insurer clients might have yet to make up the mind whether or not to take over the conduct of the proceedings on behalf of the insured.  This is indeed the number one golden rule when one handles litigation matter.

Second, no matter how overwhelmingly legitimate ground the insurer clients may have to decline policy liability in the EC context, the litigator has to remind the insurer clients forcefully on their statutory obligations under the ECO and the legal implication of Lo Siu Wa v. Employees’ Compensation Assistance Fund Board and anr., FACV No. 12 of 2017, 31st January 2018.  It is absolutely repugnant to learn that a litigator could have left an EC claim going undefended especially when Falcon also casted doubt on the validity of the claim not to mention the detriment caused to the insurer clients.

Third, irrespective of the delay in taking out the joining-in summons, the facts of this case, or at least what Falcon was arguing is that the Applicant’s claim coupled with others were suspicious, unusual and extraordinary.  This certainly renders a legitimate ground for Falcon to apply for setting aside the Interlocutory Judgment hence enhancing the chance of success in its joining-in application.  It is puzzled why Falcon did not attempt both in the first place.

Some might say, hindsight is always 20/20.  This is exactly why when one advises its insurer clients to decline policy liability especially in the EC context, one has to be very cautious to ensure all the interests of the insurer clients are well protected and the strategy is best planned ahead.  One should not lose sight of a default judgment in the EC context does have impact on issues in common law claim.  It is capable of giving rise to an estoppel on the issue of employment relationship as it is final and conclusive until the default judgment being set aside.

Wisdom Newsletter – Shipping (Issue 37)


Anti-Suit Injunction: Is multiplicity of proceedings necessarily unconscionable?

Plain Sail Holdings Ltd v Lau Wing Yan [2020] HKCFI 653

This case concerns an application by the Plaintiffs for orders restraining the Defendants from pursuing proceedings against the Plaintiffs in relation to vessels formerly known as MV “BBG Hope” and MV “BBG Glory” (“Vessels”) and specifically certain proceedings commenced against the Plaintiffs in Second Maritime Court in Panama (“Panama Proceedings”).

After a careful consideration of the relevant factors and arguments, Madam Recorder Yvonne Cheng SC dismissed the Plaintiffs’ application.


The Defendant and another individual Mr. Chu Kong (“Chu”) each own 50% of a BVI Company known as Ocean Sino Limited (“OSL”). OSL owned a Hong Kong Company known as PBM Asset Management Limited (“PBM”), which owned 49% of the share in BGA Holdings Limited (“BGAH”). BGAG wholly owned (directly and directly) various subsidiaries (“BGAH Subsidiaries”) that ultimately owned the Vessels.

The BGAH Subsidiaries entered into an addendum agreement to loan agreement with Premier Bright Holdings Limited (“Premier”) to, inter alia, grant a ship mortgage over the Vessels in favor of Premier’s nominee, Lohas Finance Limited (“Lohas”). On BGAH Subsidiaries’ default of the loan, the Vessels were put to sale and acquired by the Plaintiff.

The Defendant said that the aforesaid loan agreements, nomination agreement of Lohas and the mortgage was made without his knowledge. He further claimed that the default loan agreement was engineered by Chu for his benefit.

Proceedings commenced by the Defendant

The Defendant issued 2 in rem writs in Hong Kong respectively against the Vessels as well as 2 admiralty actions seeking orders to rectify the register of the HK Shipping Registry in relation to the Vessels (“HK Proceedings”). The BGAH Subsidiaries issued Summons to strike out the writs in the HK Proceedings, which were subsequently withdrawn. The writs in the Hong Kong Proceedings were never served on the Plaintiff.

The Defendant commenced 2 actions in rem in Singapore. The writs of both actions had already expired at the time of hearing of the Plaintiff’s application.

The Defendant commenced the Panama Proceedings for, inter alia, a declaration that the mortgage and sale of the Vessel were invalid and obtained an injunction to prohibit the transfer, sale, disposal, cancellation from the Panamanian Registry or recording encumbrances or mortgages on the Vessels and ordered various directorates of the Panamanian Maritime Authority to abstain from, and ban, the recording of any such acts (“Panama Injunction”). The Plaintiff sought to appeal the Panama Injunction and challenged the jurisdiction of the Panamanian Court, both the appeal and the jurisdictional challenge were dismissed.


The learned judge noted that an anti-suit injunction may be granted where the conduct of the party to be restrained is unconscionable, vexatious or oppressive. Her Ladyship also referred to, inter alia, the following principles, established by the leading authorities:

(1) Where the Court is not enforcing an exclusive jurisdiction agreement, an anti-suit injunction should only be made in exceptional circumstances where justice requires intervention of the Court.

(2) It is a minimum but insufficient requirement for the applicant to show that the local forum is the natural forum (that is, clearly more appropriate than other forum). It does not suffice to show that the local forum is merely a natural forum, that is, one that is not inappropriate.

(3) After satisfying that local forum is the natural forum, the Court should then consider whether justice requires the claimant in the foreign court be restrained from proceeding there.

After considering the facts of the case, the Court was not persuaded that Hong Kong was clearly the more appropriate forum.

More remarkably, the Court held that it in any event did not consider the foreign proceedings to be unconscionable. The learned judge rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that there was no legitimate reason behind the multiplicity of the proceedings. Specifically, Her Ladyship took note that:

(1) the Hong Kong Proceedings were commenced against the backdrop of BGAH, Lohuas and Chu’s refusal to desist from selling the Vessel. Moreover, at the material time, the Vessels flew the Kong flags and were registered in Hong Kong.

(2) The Singapore Proceedings were commenced because the Defendant heard from the brokers the Vessels were to be delivered to their buyers respectively in Singapore and between Singapore to Japan.

(3) The Panama Proceedings were commenced due to change of the Vessels’ registration to Panama.

(4) the Defendant did not thereafter pursue the Hong Kong Proceedings nor the Singapore Proceedings.

The Court also held that since the Defendant had all along not proceeded with the Hong Kong Proceedings (the writs of which were never served on the Plaintiff) and now agreed to undertake not to proceed with them, it could not be said the Singapore Proceedings or the Panama Proceedings were commenced in bad faith for the purpose of frustrating Hong Kong proceedings or that there are proceedings in Hong Kong which needed to be protected by the grant of a restraining order.

The Court also rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the Panama Proceedings was hopeless. Specifically, it was noted that that the Plaintiff was unable to show that the Panama Proceedings was “so utterly absurd that it cannot possibly succeed” or “plainly bound to fail’ in circumstances where the Plaintiff’s appeal of the Panama Injunction and its application to annual the Panama Proceedings were both dismissed by the Panama Court.

In similar vein, the Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s argument that the Defendant knew his claims in Panama Proceedings was hopeless. The basis of the Plaintiff’s argument that was that A Chan J had held in the judgment concerning the costs of the striking out applications of the Hong Kong Proceedings, which were analogous with the Panama Proceedings, that the Hong Kong Proceedings were plainly unsustainable. However, Madam Recorder Yvonne Cheng SC noted that A Chan  J was not expressing any view on the merits of the Panama Proceedings, which in any event could not be said to be hopeless in the light of the Panama Court’s dismissal of the Plaintiff’s appeal and jurisdictional challenge.


A party relying on a contractual entitlement not to be sue in a foreign jurisdiction has, in the absence of some special circumstances, a legitimate interest under the contract to enforce that contractual right against the other party to the contract. Thus, where a foreign suit is brought in breach of a Hong Kong jurisdiction or arbitration clause, the Court will ordinarily grant an anti-suit injunction to restrain the said foreign suit.

On the other hand, where a party relies on conduct which is unconscionable for a non-contractual reason, the legitimate interest must be the existence of local proceedings which need to be protected by the grant of an anti-suit injunction. Specifically, this case shows that multiplicity of proceedings is not unconscionable per se and will not amount to a ground for granting an anti-suit injunction at least insofar as there are legitimate grounds for bringing proceedings in more than one jurisdictions. It also demonstrates that the Hong Kong Court will be reluctant in finding a foreign action to be hopeless in circumstances where the foreign court has allowed the action to proceed.

This is a welcome decision to those operating in the maritime world, who often have legitimate needs to commence proceedings in multiple jurisdictions, for the purpose of protecting their interests.

Wisdom Newsletter – Personal Injury (Issue 36)

Personal Injury


In the matter of an EC Application between Hui Po Chi v. Trade Travel (Hong Kong) Limited, DCEC No. 406 of 2017, H.H. Judge Levy, 9th September 2020.


The Applicant was a bus-captain who met 2 separate accidents respectively in the course of employment with Trade Travel (Hong Kong) Limited (“the Respondent”) and New Lantao Bus Co (1973) Limited (“New Lantao”).

The 1st alleged accident occurred on 12 April 2015 (“the 1st Alleged Accident”) when the Applicant was in the employ of the Respondent. 3 separate payments between April and June 2015 in the total sum of HK$23,704.94 were made to the Applicant (“the Said Payments”). According to the Respondent, the Said Payments were made under Section 33 of the Employment Ordinance, Cap. 51 (“EO”) for sickness allowances and not payments pursuant to Section 10 of the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance, Cap. 282 (“ECO”) as the Respondent had no knowledge of the 1st Alleged Accident at time when it made the Said Payments.

On 25th November 2015, the Applicant worked for New Lantao and she met with the 2nd alleged accident on 7th April 2016 (“the 2nd Alleged Accident”). The Applicant received periodical payments from New Lantao on various dates between April and November 2016.

Cunningham Lindsey (Hong Kong) Limited (“Cunningham”) was the loss adjuster appointed by Falcon Insurance Company (Hong Kong) Limited (“Falcon”), the EC insurer of both the Respondent and New Lantao. On 1st November 2016, Cunningham requested the Applicant to attend a medical examination pursuant to Section 16 (1A) of the ECO (“Purported s 16 Request”) scheduled on 6 December 2016 (“the Scheduled Examination”).

In response to the request, Messrs B Mak & Co (“B Mak”) for the Applicant wrote on 28th November 2016 that the Applicant would not attend the Scheduled Examination on the ground that the Applicant’s medical condition had yet to be stabilized. Falcon and Cunningham’s further requests of the Applicant attending another medical examination were also declined by B Mak.

As the Applicant had failed to attend the Scheduled Examination, the Respondent invoked Section 16(4) of the ECO and issued a Summons to strike out the Applicant’s EC Application.


The Learned Judge found that the Purported s 16 Request was made on behalf of the Respondent.

However, the Learned Judge rejected the Respondent’s argument that it had satisfied the statutory requirement to make periodical payment under Section 10 of ECO by making the Said Payments. By its own admission, the Said Payments were made under Section 33 of the EO and not Section 10 of the ECO. Furthermore, the Respondent had no knowledge of the 1st Alleged Accident when it made the Said Payments to the Applicant. Hence, the Respondent did not intend the Said Payments to be periodical payments for the purpose of Section 10 of the ECO.

The Learned Judge also rejected the Respondent’s argument that it had satisfied the periodical payment requirement under Section 10 of the ECO by the Applicant’s admitting receipt of the periodical payments paid by New Lantao. There was no evidence showing the periodical payment received by the Applicant from New Lantao was made on behalf of the Respondent.

As the Respondent had not made the periodical payments at the time when Cunningham made the Purported s 16 Request, the Respondent was therefore not entitled to make the Purported s 16 Request in the first place for the purpose of Section 16(1) of the ECO.

The Learned Judge, by way of obiter dictum, reminded the legal practitioners again that that refusal to attend the Section 16 medical examination on the ground that the employee’s medical condition is not stabilized does not constitute “reasonable cause” for the purpose of Section 16(4) of the ECO.


About 2 years ago, legal practitioners acting for the defence in the EC claim were thrilled to read the Judgment handed down by H.H. Judge Harold Leung in the case of Cheung Sau Lin v. Tsui Wah Efford Management Limited, DCEC No. 2438 of 2014, which can be regarded as the pioneer judgment in bringing Section 16(4) of the ECO to life. Simply put, if the employee is receiving periodical payment from the employer, the employer is entitled to arrange medical examination under Section 16(1) of the ECO and if the employee refuses to attend such an examination, the making of periodical payment can be suspended until the employee attends the medical examination. If the failure exceeds 15 days from the date of the medical examination, no compensation shall be payable pursuant to Section 16(4) of the ECO unless the Court finds a reasonable cause for such failure.

However, this sword seems to have been mistakenly drawn by the defence in the last 2 years. It appears that some of the legal practitioners have mistaken one important element required under Section 16(4) of the ECO, that is, the periodical payment must be paid by the same employer and it needs to be continued paying to the employee at the time when the request for medical examination is made to the employee.

This sword is powerful. The ECO scheme is meant to be a no-fault and quick financial relief mechanism for the employee to get the compensation. One could reasonably expect the Court will take a very stringent approach in ensuring all legal requirements have been strictly complied with before dismissing an employee’s claim entirely.

Wisdom Newsletter – Shipping (Issue 35)

The world is facing unprecedented challenge caused by Covid-19. Tsui & Co have adopted some contingent measures to ensure that our clients continue to receive professional advice and all the necessary support including any legal issues arising from this pandemic. We have also taken some appropriate steps to protect the safety and health of our staff and to minimize any impact on the cases being handled by us. Seeing that it is important to face the situation positively, we wish to keep you updated on laws by this newsletter. Stay safe and healthy, everybody!



Dayang (HK) Marine Shipping Co., Ltd v. Asia Master Logistics Ltd, HCCW 14/2019, [2020] HKCFI 311, Deputy High Court Judge William Wong SC in Court, 12 March 2020.

A winding-up order has long been recognized as a draconian remedy. Many creditor-petitioners believe that presenting a winding-up petition is the most efficacious method of obtaining payment. However, it is not uncommon for a contract under which the debt is alleged to arise contains an arbitration clause which requires the dispute to be resolved by arbitration. In Re Southwest Pacific Bauxite (HK) Ltd [2018] 2 HKLRD 449 (“Lasmos”), Harris J held that in such circumstances, if the company disputes the debt and takes the steps required under the arbitration clause to commence the contractually mandated dispute resolution process, the winding-up petition should generally be stayed.

Despite these difficulties, we successfully acted for the Petitioner, the disponent owner of a vessel under a charterparty containing an arbitration clause, in obtaining a winding-up order against the charterer, the Respondent in this case.


The Petitioner, Dayang (HK) Marine Shipping Co., Limited, and the Respondent, Asia Master Logistics Limited, entered into a TCT charterparty whereby the Petitioner chartered its vessel, MV “Aoli 5” (the “Vessel”) to the Respondent. The amount of hire to be paid by the Respondent to the Petitioner is US$321,377.30 (the “Debt”). The Respondent did not deny that the Debt was due and owing, but it raised a counterclaim against the Petitioner in relation to an alleged breach of the fixture note. In particular, the Respondent alleged that during the unloading process, some bags of rice fell off. However, the captain of the Vessel was uncooperative and refused to follow the Respondent’s instructions in handling the cargo.

The Respondent further alleged that the Petitioner’s refusal to change the captain upon the Respondent’s request was in breach of the Petitioner’s duties under the fixture note, and the Petitioner should bear some responsibility for the losses it suffered by reason of the delay. It was submitted by the Respondent that the dispute should be dealt with by way of arbitration, pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the fixture note.


The Learned Judge made a finding that the Debt was not disputed by the Respondent in good faith and on substantial grounds. Firstly, the Learned Judge was of the view that there was prima facie no dispute to the Debt. The Respondent had given no particulars as to the duration of the alleged delay and the extent of loss it suffered by reason of the alleged breach of the fixture note on the Petitioner’s part. Secondly, the Court considered that the Respondent’s counterclaim appeared to consist of bare allegations without any concrete evidence to substantiate its claims.

In respect of the arbitration clause, the Court was of the view that up to the date of the hearing, the Respondent had not commenced any arbitration proceedings. The Learned Judge accepted that the Respondent, who merely sent a draft request form (Form 1) to the Petitioner’s solicitors and requested to see if the Petitioner would be willing to attempt arbitration, had no genuine intention to arbitrate and agreed that the draft Form 1 was not properly served on the Petitioner as the Petitioner’s solicitors were not duly authorized to accept service. In the circumstances, the Court rejected the Respondent’s submissions that the Petition should be dismissed because of the existence of the arbitration clause.

For the sake of completeness had the Respondent properly commenced arbitration proceedings, the Learned Judge considered that without express limitations, the scope of the arbitration clause did not preclude the Petitioner’s right to commence winding up proceedings against the Respondent. Having considered all the relevant authorities in Hong Kong, Singapore and the UK, the Court clarified by way of obiter the present state of the law to be, inter alia, that whether or not the debt had arisen from a contract incorporating an arbitration clause, a debtor-company which intends to dispute the existence of a debt must still show there is a bona fide dispute of a debt on substantial grounds before the Court could exercise its discretion to stay or dismiss the winding-up proceedings.

The fact that arbitration proceedings have commenced or would be commenced may be relevant evidence that there is a bona fide dispute, but this alone would not be sufficient to prove the existence of a bona fide dispute on substantial grounds.

The Learned Judge further considered that the winding-up proceedings do not have the effect of resolving the disputes. It is the liquidator who finally resolves disputes over the debt (subject to the possibility of appeal). Accordingly, the presentation of a winding-up order per se does not amount to a breach of the parties’ contractual obligation to resolve disputes by way of arbitration. It follows that commencing winding-up proceedings is not against the policy behind the Arbitration Ordinance and the object of that Ordinance.


The above ruling comes as a piece of good news to all creditor-petitioners who have hesitation to present a winding-up petition when there is an arbitration clause in the contract. The debtor-company must still show that there is a bona fide dispute over the debt on substantial grounds. However, creditors-petitioners are also warned about the adverse costs consequence of abusing the winding-up process. The Court has made it clear that if a creditor-petitioner knows that the debt is disputed in good faith and on substantial grounds, the creditor-petitioner may be liable to pay the debtor-company’s costs on an indemnity basis and it may also be at risk of liability under the tort of malicious prosecution.

To the debtor-companies who are in fear that the winding-up process may be abused by some creditors, they should make sure the arbitration clause in the contract is carefully drafted such that it contains express limitations on the creditor-petitioner’ rights to wind-up. The Court, however, alerted that agreements excluding the right to present a winding-up petition may potentially be unenforceable as a matter of public policy. That is a risk that a debtor-company would have to assume if it wishes to obtain better bargain when a dispute over the debt arises.

Overall, the present Judgment is welcome. The obiter resolves the inflexibility of the Lasmos principle and preserves the Court’s hitherto flexible discretion to make a winding-up order. The Court is not required to dismiss or stay a winding-up petition as long as the threefold conditions in Lasmos have been satisfied. That will ensure the creditor-petitioner will not be deprived of all tangible remedies if the assets of the debtor-company have been dissipated by the time the action for debt has been completed by arbitration. This is particularly useful in shipping disputes.

Wisdom Newsletter – Personal Injury (Issue 34)

Personal Injury

Who is more powerful?

Wong Chun Wah v. Chau Kwei Yin, Chow Yat Kuen, Employees Compensation Assistance Fund Board, FACV No. 6 of 2019, Chief Justice Ma, Mr. Justice Ribeiro PJ, Mr. Justice Fok PJ, Mr. Justice Stock NPJ and Madam Justice McLachlin NPJ, 20th December 2019.


1. Whether the Courts have jurisdiction to make costs order against ECAS in certain proceedings to which it is a party?

2. Whether ECAS is empowered to enter into binding settlements regarding claims or potential claims for payments out of the fund which it administers?


The plaintiff was an interior decoration worker who sustained injuries at work. The 2nd defendant had been engaged by the 1st defendant to do the construction work. The plaintiff alleged that the 2nd defendant was his employer but brought proceedings against the defendants for compensation under the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance, Cap. 282 (“ECO”) and for common law damages. The case was discontinued against the 1st defendant in 2015 when he settled the plaintiff’s claims by payment of $80,000.

That left the plaintiff’s claims, which included one for over HK$4.7 million damages, against the 2nd defendant who had no insurance cover and who acted in person throughout. Accordingly, ECAS obtained leave to be joined as 3rd defendant in the proceedings, stating that it wished to participate in the assessment of damages. It proceeded in 2016 to commission a medical report jointly with the plaintiff and to file an answer to the plaintiff’s statement of damages, putting forward a lower assessment.

The plaintiff obtained judgment against the 2nd defendant for HK$602,380.00 before Deputy District Judge Chow in the ECO proceedings in September 2016. The common law action then came on for trial in May 2017 and at its commencement, the plaintiff and ECAS agreed to settle his potential claim under the Employees Compensation Assistance Ordinance, Cap., 365 (“ECAO”) for HK$1.42 million.

The 2nd defendant was not a party to the settlement and the trial proceeded against him before Deputy High Court Judge To, resulting in an award of damages in the sum of HK$2,110,927.00. Deducting the sums of HK$80,000.00 received from the 1st defendant and the ECO award of HK$602,380.00, the net amount of damages due to the plaintiff from the 2nd defendant was HK$1,428,547.00, which was marginally more than the settlement amount agreed with ECAS. The Judge ordered the 2nd defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs but refused the plaintiff’s application for costs against ECAS as from the date of its joinder in the action, directing that there should be no order as to costs as between the plaintiff and the ECAS.

The plaintiff sought and obtained leave from the Court of Appeal to appeal against the direction of no order as to costs. By a respondent’s notice, ECAS sought to uphold the Judge’s order on the additional ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction to make any costs orders against it. The Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal against the refusal of costs against ECAS and did not accept ECAS’s argument that there was no jurisdiction to order costs against it in such proceedings. ECAS was granted leave to appeal the captioned two questions of law to the Court of Final Appeal.


Section 20B(3) of the ECAO does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to order costs against ECAS in relation to proceedings in which it has been joined as a party. The power to make such costs orders is conferred by Section 52A of the High Court Ordinance, Cap. 4. Section 29 of ECAO also recognises the existence of such power.

In exercising its discretion regarding a possible costs order against ECAS, the principle that costs normally follow the event does not apply, given the ECAS’s statutory role and the starting-point is no order as to costs. Needless to say, the Court has a wide discretion and may depart from this if the circumstances warrant a different order.

Section 29 authorises ECAS to settle potential claims for relief payments in amounts it assesses to be reasonable, arriving at such assessments in good faith on available information considered sufficient after having made due inquiry. Settlement is an alternative means for disposing of a claim and obtaining relief. The settlement agreement constitutes a binding contract and is not affected by any Judgment which the employee may subsequently obtain against the employer. It should not generally be necessary to pursue that action after settling with ECAS.

The appeal was dismissed and although the outcome would normally entail making an order for costs against ECAS, the Court of Final Appeal took into account its special statutory role and accepting that there was a need for clarification of the legal position affecting ECAS’s operations hence the Court made no order as to costs.


This judgment is indeed good news to the employee. By the operation of Section 29 of ECAO which empowers ECAS to strike a settlement with any party hence the employee does not have to go through the painful exercise of taking the matter to trial in order to obtain a judgment.

If ECAS is not joined as a party to the proceedings, Section 28 of the ECAO gives a wider power to ECAS to protect its costs and settle with the plaintiff if ECAS thinks that the plaintiff is or might be entitled to obtain payment from the Fund.

While ECAS is entitled to give pressure on plaintiffs to settle, it is unsatisfactory that there is no mechanise for the plaintiffs to make any sanctioned offer or Calderbank offer against ECAS to protect their costs. It is because there is “no event” between the plaintiffs and ECAS. Hence, ECAS is rarely asked to pay the plaintiffs’ costs unless its conduct is unreasonable or misconceived or unjustifiably antagonistic, unnecessarily prolonging its intervention or otherwise untoward.

In view of the Civil Justice Reform, our view is that the law should be changed such that the plaintiffs may give counter-pressure on ECAS to settle the actions as soon as possible and to protect the Fund. This proposed change is particularly important to the common law actions because unlikely Employees’ Compensation actions, any cost order against the employers in such proceedings, even if awarded on indemnity basis after effective sanctioned offers, is not recoverable from ECAS.

Wisdom Newsletter – Shipping (Issue 33)


Bright Shipping Limited (P) v Changhong Group (HK) Limited (D) [2019] HKCA 1062, CACV No. 102 of 2019


On 6 January 2018, there was a collision between D’s cargo vessel “CF CRYSTAL” and P’s tanker “SANCHI” on the high seas but within the exclusive economic zones (“EEZs”) of the PRC, South Korea and Japan.

On 9 January 2018, D commenced inter-ship proceedings against P in the Shanghai Maritime Court (“SMC”) and applied to establish in the SMC 2 limitation funds, one for personal injury and one for property. At the same time, P commenced an in personam action against D in Hong Kong for collision liability and quantum because D is a Hong Kong incorporated company with a registered office in Hong Kong.

Against the above background that D made an application for staying P’s proceedings in Hong Kong on the ground of forum non conveniens (“FNC”).


Applying the Spiliada principles, it was accepted that Hong Kong was not the natural forum for the inter-ship litigation. The dispute concerns whether D was able to establish that SMC was clearly and distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong as the forum for the trial of the inter-ship action. Two main arguments were advanced by D.

D first argued that the trial judge had made no reference to the national laws relating the exercise of the sovereignty of the PRC over the EEZ. However, the CA rejected the argument on the grounds that (1) the location of the collision lied within the EEZs of the PRC, Japan and Korea and (2) a state’s rights over EEZ under UNCLOS do not apply to navigation activity.

D also argued that lis alibi pendens (related proceedings abroad) was a material factor for the consideration of FNC. As expected, the CA held that the constitution of limitation funds by D in the SMC pursuant to the PRC Maritime Code is not a legal bar to bringing proceedings in Hong Kong because the PRC is not a state party to the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976 (“LLMC”). Also, the SMC’s inter-ship proceedings have not gone beyond the initial stage and P had not accepted service of the same.

The argument that D could bear liabilities up to 2 separate limits if the Hong Kong proceedings were not stayed did not assist D at all. The CA explained that a ship owner who has already paid a claim has a well-established right to take into account the sum he previously paid in the distribution of the limitation funds. Accordingly, D’s concern that it would be burdened with liability up to 2 separate limits was misplaced.

The CA, in its obiter, found that the significant difference in tonnage limitation between the PRC and Hong Kong (the relevant monetary limit in Hong Kong is roughly 3.6 times of that in the PRC because the Hong Kong limit takes into account the loss of value due to inflation) will deprive P of a legitimate juridical advantage and substantial justice will not be achieved in the SMC if a stay of the Hong Kong proceedings is granted. Such deprivation could be unjust to P and could be capable of being a decisive factor in refusing a stay.


The Spiliada principles are settled law on FNC and involve an exercise of discretion. The court aims at finding out a forum which is suitable for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice. This is different from the Australian approach.

It can be seen from this case that the treatment of mainland Chinese courts has no material difference from other foreign courts. The quality of justice in mainland courts is not a factor to be taken into consideration. The logistic issues of witnesses play little importance.

Not surprisingly, the CA considered that while some weight was given, it was nothing unusual about limitation and liability actions taking place in different jurisdictions. In fact, even under Article 13 of the LLMC, it only bars a person having made a claim against the fund from attaching the assets of a person by or on behalf of whom the fund has constituted but P did not make such a claim. It is expected that the court is more inclined to stay if a fund is set up in a state party to the LLMC.

The CA reaffirmed the principle that it may only interfere with the exercise of a judge’s discretion in limited circumstances. It is therefore important to prepare well when FNC is argued before the judge of the 1st instance.

All in all, this action is a fair illustration of the “One Country, Two Systems” principle.

Wisdom Newsletter – Insurance (Issue 32)


Good Faith and Valid Reasons in Claw Back Provisions

FWD Life Insurance Co (Bermuda) Ltd v Poon Cindy [2019] 3 HKLRD 455, [2019] HKCA 697, Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No 181 of 2015 Lam V-P, Cheung and Chu JJA 24 June 2019

This was an appeal by the defendant against the judgment of Deputy Judge Tony Poon concerning whether the defendant’s employment had been wrongfully terminated by the plaintiff-employer.


The Defendant, Cindy Poon (“Cindy”) was engaged by the Plaintiff, FWD Life Insurance Co (Bermuda) Ltd (“FWD”) as an Agency Director. An individual Agent’s Agreement (“iAA”);  and an Agency Management Agreement (“AMA”) were signed for such engagement.

Upon the engagement, FWD paid Cindy a sum of $492,000 by way of Signing Fee (“SF”) and another sum of $492,000 by way of advanced payment of Performance Bonus (“PB”). Further, from March to August 2008, FWD paid Cindy a total sum of $328,002, a by way of Monthly Special Bonus (“MSB”) calculated at $54,667 per month. These payments were made under the terms of a Letter of Offer of 6 March 2008 issued by FWD in favour of Cindy except that the PB were paid in advance at the request of CIndy. According to those terms, these sums were repayable to FWD if Cindy’s engagement was terminated within 30 months (for SF and MSB) or 12 months (for PB) from the date of her contract.

 What happened next?

Cindy’s engagement was terminated by FWD within 12 months on 24 September 2008. Notice of termination was given in accordance with Clause 7.2 of the IAA which reads:

“7.2 Subject to any subsequent agreement to the contrary, this Agreement may be terminated by either party by giving to the other party a notice of termination in writing to such effect and the notice period, unless with the consent of the other party, shall not be less than six (6) days.”

A provision to similar effect can be found in the AMA at Clause 7:

“7. Either party shall be entitled to terminate this Agreement without any reasons being given thereof, by giving to the other six (6) days’ written notice of its intention to terminate the same.”

It followed that FWD demanded the repayment of SF, PB and MSB from Cindy.

 Judgment in the First Instance

FWD commenced proceedings against Cindy for repayment of SF, PB and MSB in the total amount of $1,312,00 pursuant to terms provided in the IAA, AMA and the Letter of Offer. FWD’s case on the cause of termination was that Cindy had failed to meet performance target set for Agency Director.

Cindy said that she had been wrongfully terminated. According to her, the 2nd Third Party Danny Chan had been receiving a commission (called override) in respect of Cindy’s management earning. However, he could not continue to do so after he failed to meet the performance for promotion to Agency Director because an Agency Director could not be a downline agent of an Agency Manager. The only way to maintain his entitlement to the override from Cindy’s earning was to demote Cindy from Agency Director to Agency Manager. But Cindy refused to accept the proposed demotion. As a result, Cindy claimed that she was terminated by FWD wrongfully.

Deputy High Court Judge Tony Poon (as he then was) made the findings that the cause of the termination of Cindy was her refusal to accept a demotion. However, he gave judgment in favour of FWD and held that FWD was not in breach of the IAA or the Letter of Offer in exercising its power of termination. FWD was therefore entitled to recover the Total Sum of $1,312,002 plus interests from Cindy.

Appeal in CACV 181/2015

Subsequently, Cindy obtained leave to rely on appeal on the argument that FWD’s power to terminate her employment or demote her was subject to an implied term of good faith and rationality (“Good Faith and Rationality Implied Term”).

Held: Allowing Cindy’s appeal and remitting the case to the Judge for consideration.

I. Good Faith and Rationality Implied Term

Lord Sumption set out the general rule in British Telecommunications plc v Telefónica O2 UK Ltd [2014] Bus LR 765 as follows:

“ As a general rule, the scope of a contractual discretion will depend on the nature of the discretion and the construction of the language conferring it. But it is well established that in the absence of very clear language to the contrary, a contractual discretion must be exercised in good faith and not arbitrarily or capriciously …. This will normally mean that it must be exercised consistently with its contractual purpose ….”

In view that the most relevant authorities in a similar context had not been decided when the trial took place and the Good Faith and Rationality Implied Term was not put forward during trial, the Court of Appeal took the view that it would not be just to deprive Cindy of the chance to rely on this implied term. Although further evidence might be adduced, it could not be said at this stage that Cindy’s case based on this implied term was unarguable.

It was thus held by CA that the question of whether the Good Faith and Rationality Implied Term could have arisen would be remitted to the Judge.

II. Valid Reason Implied Term

During the hearing in the First Instance, Cindy had argued that there was an implied term to the IAA that it would not be terminated without valid reasons and an implied term to the Letter of Offer that she would not be demoted from the position as Agency Director without any valid reasons (“Valid Reason Implied Term”).

The trial Judge did not give much consideration to the Valid Reason Implied Term against demotion since Cindy did not actually accept the demotion. He so held notwithstanding he was aware of the nexus of the proposed demotion and the termination.

The Court of Appeal was of the view that the Judge’s ruling on the Valid Reason Implied Term was erroneous. As mentioned above, the trial Judge had already made the findings that the cause of the termination of Cindy was her refusal to accept a demotion. It would thus be logical to deduce that if there was indeed a Valid Reason Implied Term for demotion, it would be relevant in establishing the Valid Reason Implied Term for termination since the termination was based upon her refusal to accept demotion.

It was thus held by CA that the question of whether the Valid Reason Implied Term could have arisen would be remitted to the Judge.


Where life insurers or in fact any employers faced with the need for them to invoke the claw back provision provided in the agreements with contractual discretion, it would be advisable for them to adopt a rational approach concerning the termination with good faith.

Then what by means of being “rational”? The classic definition was given by Lord Diplock when summarising the grounds of judicial review in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 410: “By ‘irrationality’ I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’. … It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.”

In practical terms, the employers are also advised to offer some proper explanation, such as not meeting certain performance standard or breach of certain employment terms, to the employees concerned when they are to invoke the claw back provisions by way of termination.

Let’s wait and see for the result of any re-trial by the Judge. But bearing in mind of the cost implications of a full-blown re-trial, as it might well be the case that the parties would settle!